Tag Archives: temporary insanity

Should PMDD Mitigate Sentencing?

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Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD) is a disorder listed in the DSM-IV that afflicts between 3-8% of women.  It is a severe form of PMS that may have significant impacts on the lives of those who suffer from it.  In the luteal phase of the menstrual cycle, hormone levels in the body are changing rapidly, with a noted steep increase in progesterone.  Progesterone, though important for the reproductive system, is known to have psychiatric effects including depression, mood swings, emotional instability, and aggression.  These symptoms and more, including panic attacks, increased interpersonal conflicts, and feeling overwhelmed or out of control, characterize PMDD.

A condition that causes increased aggression and other emotional instability?  It is easy to imagine that at this time each month, the women whom this disease afflicts are at an increased likelihood of committing any number of emotional crimes.  Does this constitute temporary insanity?

The temporary insanity defense was used for the first time in 1859 when Daniel Sickles claimed to have been driven insane by the knowledge of his wife’s affair when he killed her lover.  Since then it has been used to reduce sentences.  Because of the recognized emotional disturbances associated with PMDD, it is a good candidate for the basis of temporary insanity.

Caffeine-Induced Murder

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If you’ve ever pulled a caffeine-fueled all-nighter, you know that the feeling can be akin to deliriousness, drunkenness, and a generally not-quite-right state of mind. So you might imagine that caffeine overload could drive someone to do crazy things, right? That is just what the lawyers for Woody Will Smith are arguing – a temporary insanity defense – that their defendant ingested excessive caffeine and was therefore temporarily insane when he strangled his wife with an extension cord in May 2009. According to the DSM-IV, a caffeine overdose is defined as more than 300 milligrams; Smith was ingesting more than 400 milligrams a day during that period. He told his psychologist that he wasn’t sleeping for fear that his wife would leave him and take their two children. He recalls taking his children to school the morning of the murder, but little else.

The temporary insanity defense rests on the assumption that the defendant did not know the nature of his criminal act at the time that it was committed. It is possible that the sleep deprivation resulting from excessive caffeine consumption led him to a “brief psychosis,” according to his psychologist. If this is true, it could be a mitigating factor because of his “diminished capacity” to understand his actions. The problem with the defense is that it is difficult to prove his mental state at the time of the crime. This might be a case where improvements in lie-detection technology could help determine whether or not he really knew what he was doing at the time of the murder. It could also help gauge whether or not there was any premeditated intent involved. In this case, and in other cases of substance-induced psychosis, prosecutors have little to rely on but patient testimony. Improving the reliability of this testimony would go a long way to proving the case of temporary insanity.

Unexpected violence: a case for temporary insanity?

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Last Monday, a jury decided that Steven Hayes, involved in the 2007 Cheshire home invasion, would get the death penalty. This now infamous crime, which left Jennifer Hawke-Petit and her daughters Hayley and Michaela brutally murdered, started out as a typical burglary and—for a reason that still remains unclear—turned unspeakably violent. I found this case sharply reminiscent of past proceedings in which suspects had “pled not guilty by reason of temporary insanity.”

Hayes was merely a habitual burglar. He had a long history of theft and imprisonment and of poor behavior in prison. He had been in violation of his parole when the crime happened. Despite all this, he had no history of criminal violence. And when Hayes was sentenced to death, he let out a smile, reinforcing the statements he previously made about wanting to die out of guilt for the crimes committed. What could have turned this serial burglar into a triple-murderer that raped and burned his victims? Was Hayes temporarily insane when he entered the Cheshire home?

His lawyers—and many other experts on the case—insist that his partner, Joshua Komisarjevsky, is the violent mastermind, the leader in the Cheshire crime. They also argued for mitigating factors: “intense rage”, “despair”, “confusion”, an “abusive childhood” and a “drug addiction.”4 The burglary itself was premeditated, but it seems that the rapes and the murders were not. It seems plausible that intense despair, drug use, and manipulation by Komisarjevsky could have severely clouded Hayes’ ability to reason properly.

As it stands today, we have real trouble establishing why someone like Steven Hayes—or anyone with no affinity for violent behavior—can turn viciously violent. It is almost impossible to make this argument without strong evidence—evidence that tells us exactly what sort of state Hayes was in, and from that what we can infer about his behavior.

I believe that this is just the problem that neuroscience strives to solve. Neuroscience will one day help lawyers, judges, and juries understand the fine line between what, behaviorally, is and is not in our control as complexly plastic humans.

Sources:

(1) Poitras, Colin. “Family Shattered.” Hartford Courant. 24 July 2007. Web. Accessed 8 November 2010. <http://www.courant.com/community/hc-petit0724,0,274649.story>

(2) Glaberson, William. “In Cheshire Murder Case, Jurors Vote for Death Penalty.” New York Times. 8 November 2010. Web. Accessed 10 November 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/nyregion/09cheshire.html>

(3) Leibowitz, Barry. “Petit Family Killer Steven Hayes Wants to Die, Psychologist Testifies in Penalty Phase.” CBS News Crimesider. 27 October 2010. Web. Accessed 8 November 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20020950-504083.html>

(4) Associated Press. “Hayes’ Lawyers Cite Mitigating Factors.” 3 November 2010. Web. Accessed 10 November 2010. <http://www.wtnh.com/dpp/news/crime/new-haven-hayes-lawyers-mitigating-factors>

Murder Defense: Too Much Caffeine

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Just what exactly constitutes a mental disorder and what makes someone criminally insane is an issue that has garnered much debate in recent years. With the release of proposed revisions to the DSM, the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, even more attention has been given to the issue, as the fifth edition of the publication is said to be released in May of 2013. A recent blog posting in the Neuroethics & Law Blog, discusses some of the controversies regarding the revisions and its implications in the legal field. One common fear is that the new DSM includes too broad a range of conditions as mental disorders, such as “premenstrual syndrome,” which the blog comments is defined as: “a physiological conditions experienced by all women.” Clearly, including “PMS” as a mental disorder seems pretty extreme.

These same concerns are also expressed in an article by The Washington Post titled “Revision to the bible of psychiatry, DSM, could introduce new mental disorders.” This article comments on the fact that quirky teens can be diagnosed with “psychosis risk syndrome” and children with bad temperaments can be classified by “temper dysregulation with dysphoria.” Essentially some of these diagnoses just seem absurd and spark the question: then what’s normal? This distinction is important seeing that, in large part, the DSM goes to define what’s included in the spectrum of natural behavior and what’s not. Furthermore, nowadays, the DSM is utilized in many sectors of society including use by clinicians, national health agencies, private companies, policy makers, and legal authorities, which means that alterations to these standards affect each and every one of these sectors.

Looking into the effects of the DSM revision to the criminal justice system, it seems such changes will weigh heavily on the issue of culpability. As more conditions are brought under the umbrella of mental disorders, there are more “exemptions” given from culpability. The opinion of many psychiatrists and philosophers today is that criminal actions performed by individuals who qualify for a disorder under the DSM-5 should not be considered criminal since they are products of neural disorders that said individuals couldn’t control. Essentially, the reasoning is “it’s not their fault,” but where is the line drawn? As those boundaries are widened, some defenses just seem ridiculous. For example, an article by CNN titled “Murder defense: Too much caffeine,” talks about the trial of a man in Newport, Kentucky, Woody Will Smith, who killed his wife and claimed the defense of too much caffeine! His lawyer argued that an excessive amounts of soda, caffeine-laced diet pills, an energy drink, and sleep deprivation resulted in his committing the crime, therefore, he is not responsible. The aim by defense attorneys was to conclude that the defendant was suffering from a temporary psychotic disorder, but should too much caffeine really lead to a lighter sentence for a man who, with his bare hands, strangled his wife with an extension cord?

In my opinion, a key factor differentiating Smith’s situation from other individuals suffering from psychotic disorders is the fact that he brought this “caffeine-delusional” state upon himself and so his culpability for his actions should remain the same. If such a defense is permitted, then it could easily lead to others plotting criminals act than purposely placing themselves under a caffeine-excessive condition to receive a reduced sentence for their actions. For such reasons, there are obvious complications with broadening the definition of mental and psychotic disorders. The bottom line then is where do we draw the line?

http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/09/20/murder-defense-too-much-caffeine/?iref=storysearch

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/10/AR2010021000009.html

http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2010/10/the-new-dsm-a-challenge-for-neuroscience-in-court-andrea-lavazza-and-mario-de-caro.html