The Hard Sell for Psychopathy Research Funding

Last week, The New Yorker ran an article about neuroscientist Kent Kiehl’s search for the neurological basis of psychopathy. Kiehl points out that despite the benefit that such research could have, funding is difficult to come by. When asked why funding for research concerning other mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, is more plentiful, he answered, “Because schizophrenics are seen as victims, and psychopaths are seen as predators. The former we feel empathy for, the latter we lock up.”
While he’s probably right, it’s a strange argument. Kiehl’s goal is to eventually find a cure for psychopathy, and while this could help psychopaths themselves, the greatest benefit would be to society as a whole. As Kiehl points out, “Crime is a trillion-dollar-a-year problem. The average psychopath will be convicted of four violent crimes by the age of forty.” Surely the families of psychopaths’ victims would hope for a cure for psychopathy and no taxpayer would mind a reduction in the prison population. However, psychopaths themselves might not want to be cured. A cure might keep them out of jail, but the adjustment from psychopathy to normalcy, complete with a new found understanding of the harm they have caused others and a deflation of their inflated egos, could be difficult. Among other traits, psychopaths are characterized by a lack of remorse and a high sense of self-worth, so it seems unlikely that they would want to change. In a 2007 Nature article, one prison inmate was quoted, “I think my high psychopath score is a talent, not a sickness — I can make good strong decisions, and it’s good to have some distance with people.” Perhaps a cure would be the greatest punishment for a psychopath.
If neuroimaging can be used to find the cause of psychopathy and eventually a cure, it seems possible that it could one day be used to predict who will become a violent psychopath. This, I believe, is why the public is resistant to funding projects like Kiehl’s. Comments about a blog reporting on the New Yorker article have compared the use of his research to Nazis’ justifications of the Holocaust and expressed fear that “it’s only the poor and powerless who get forced into being ‘evaluated’ by the mental health industry”.
This belief–that research into psychopathy could be used both to wrongly help criminals and wrongly target innocent people–is the reason for the lack of psychopathy research funding. But there are ways around it. The study mentioned in the Nature article uses prisoners with psychopathic traits, but its goals are not to cure psychopathy or even to better understand the neuroscience behind it. The study is not “about” psychopathy- it is about empathy. And as people with schizophrenia or autism have an apparent inability to express or possibly feel empathy, empathy research might be an easier sell to the public and potential sources of funding than psychopathy research.

Poor Children’s Brains are Similar to Stroke Victims’

An article soon to be published in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience states that children of low socioeconomic status show brain activity similar to that of stroke patients. Scientists from the University of California, Berkeley examined normal, healthy 9- and 10-year-olds with an electroencephalograph (EEG) and found that children from low income families had prefrontal cortex (PFC) damage typically seen in adults who had suffered a stroke. The researchers are not the first to note PFC deficiencies in socioeconomically disadvantaged children. However, previous studies examined brain function indirectly, by having subjects complete various tasks. Lead author Mark Kishiyama notes, “Our study is the first with direct measure of brain activity where there is no issue of task complexity.” The children in the study watched triangles flash on a screen and had to press a button when they saw a triangle. Children from lower income families had more difficulty ignoring distractions.

Like stroke patients, the poorer children had less activity in their PFCs. The researchers note that this problem is not necessarily irreversible. At age 3, disadvantaged children have half the vocabulary of middle income 3 year olds and by age 4, they have heard 30 million fewer words. The authors suggest that PFC performance can be improved by talking to children more. This research seems likely to increase support for HeadStart and similar programs.

What I find most interesting about this research, is that the PFC activity was similar to that of stroke patients, who sometimes become violent after their stroke. Perhaps people who do not want to spend money on early childhood education programs may change their mind if they see that these programs may prevent violence later on.

Media’s Coverage of Agressive Conduct Disorder Study Fails

Recently, the journal Biological Psychology published an article about brain responses to violence in youths with aggressive conduct disorder (CD).  On Nov. 12, it was the topic of a blog entry on the New York Times‘s website and on Nov. 18, Slate attacked both the blog and the original study. I read these three items in the opposite order that I should have. The reasonable thing to do would have been to start with the journal article to form my own impressions, then read the Times blog, and finally read the Slate article.

However, I came across the Slate article, written by Daniel Engber, first and found it convincing until I read the original article. I agree with Engber’s first two main points. The participants in the study, who exhibited signs of aggression including “starting fights; bullying using a weapon; theft with confrontation of the victim; physical cruelty to people; cruelty to animals and forced sex” should not simply be called bullies. (Although Engber shows a bit of bad science on his part in suggesting that these youths with CD should be called sociopaths- the Biol. Psych. article points out that CD is a precursor to Antisocial Personality Disorder, not a synonym for it). His second point is “the ‘aggressive youths’ never inflicted any pain (real or imagined) on other people during the experiment. Whatever enjoyment or dismay they felt came from viewing a set of photographs depicting, for example, someone stepping on somebody else’s toe. So the brain-imaging data may tell us what it’s like to watch a bully but not necessarily what it’s like to be a bully.”

To be fair, I also agree with his third argument “the brain scans themselves are open to interpretation,” but unlike him, I don’t think this is a downside of the study. Of course brain scans are open to interpretation. All science is and should be open to interpretation. This doesn’t make the study “iffy” or “questionable” as Engber describes it. The researchers also aren’t shy about this fact. Among other admissions, they write, “There are important reasons to be cautious when interpreting the activation of the striatum as indicating a positive affect response to viewing others in pain, however…In humans, the striatum is activated by stimuli associated with reward, but also by salient aversive, novel, and intense stimuli.”

Engber writes, “Let’s pretend there were some good reason to wonder how much fulfillment a bully finds in his daily wedgies. The University of Chicago research wouldn’t help, even if we cared to know.” The reason why it might not help is because that wasn’t the point of the study. The goal was to determine if youths with CD “exhibit atypical empathic responses to viewing others in pain.” The findings were complicated, and in some cases, conflicted with previous studies. For instance, the researchers found no reduced amygdala responses in subjects with CD, in contrast to previous studies.

So why does this subpar journalism matter? It’s because one day (if it hasn’t happened already) some lawyer will show jurors a brain scan and try to convince them that it proves the defendant either enjoys or doesn’t enjoy others’ pain. Normally, I would think that a juror who had read about a neuroscience study like this one in Slate or the Times would be well-informed about it and able to make a reasonable decision. Unfortunately, that’s not true in this case.

Neurolaw and Attitudes Towards the Death Penalty

Watching only a few episodes of Law & Order might convince you that the latest, high-tech neuroscience techniques are used in court as often as L&O reruns are on TV, but this won’t be true until the use of these technologies becomes less expensive. No Lie MRI, which claims it can use fMRI as a more accurate polygraph, charges $30/min. Cephos, a similar company, doesn’t give prices on its website, but does mention that there are additional costs for expert testimony. No Lie MRI’s site claims the company’s services could one day improve “investor confidence” and “how wars are fought,” and individuals undoubtedly dream of a day they could scan a spouse’s or teenager’s brain, but for now, these companies’ main customers seem to be defense attorneys desperate to keep their clients off death row. In addition to detecting lies, brain scans have been presented as evidence that a defendant cannot be held culpable for a crime due to neurological defects. This type of evidence has also mainly been used in death penalty cases and remains controversial.
Of course, the death penalty itself is controversial as well. A July 2008 survey of registered voters showed that 63% of Americans are in favor of the death penalty while 29% oppose it. Since it seems that neurolaw currently mainly affects death penalty cases, could the use of neuroscience in the court change how Americans feel about the death penalty and how many defendants receive it?
fMRI lie detection is intended to provide evidence of guilt or innocence, so Americans who oppose the death penalty because they fear an innocent person may be put to death may find themselves less resistant to the death penalty when faced with this evidence. However, only 30% of respondents to one survey said they opposed the death penalty for this reason. Furthermore, fMRI lie detection will never be proven 100% accurate. Some opponents of the death penalty may be unpersuaded no matter how low the chance of error may one day be.
Support for the death penalty may decrease if fMRI lie detection becomes widespread because it would be easier to convince the public of an unfair conviction than an unfair exoneration. Even after a conviction based on fMRI evidence, evidence could turn up that proves a death row inmate’s innocence (newly found DNA evidence or surveillance tapes, for instance). The public’s support for fMRI use would surely decrease after such an incident, and because of double jeopardy, it is unlikely that someone found not guilty could later be shown to be guilty. This could lead the public to believe that such technology is more likely to inaccurately show guilt than innocence.
As for scans, a defense attorney could certainly argue that his or her client should not be held culpable because a brain defect “made” the defendent commit the crime. However, the jury might take this information to mean that the defendant has no control over his or her actions, is a danger to society, and should be put to death. Neuroscience will undoubtedly change the nature of the legal system, but how it will change perceptions of the death penalty remain to be seen. After all, the American Psychological Association reported in 2001 that attitudes toward the death penalty have a large genetic component, so American’s attitudes may be fairly resistant to change.

Indian Courts Ignore Neuroscientists’ Warnings

On June 12, 24-year old Aditi Sharma and her boyfriend Pravin Khandelwal were convicted of the murder of Sharma’s ex-fiancé Udit Bharati.  Their trials marked the first time brain scans presented as evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of a crime led to a conviction. The lie detection test, the Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature test, or BEOS, was created by Champadi Raman Mukundan, the former director of the psychology department at the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS) in Bangalore, India. The Indian media praised the use of this technology—the Times of India called BEOS a “forensic tool” the “state police can now bank on…to achieve speedy convictions” and declared “the findings clearly indicated their [Sharma and Bharati’s] involvement in the murders”—but neuroscientists in India and elsewhere were wary.

Unlike traditional polygraph tests, which detect lies through indirect means such as heart rate and skin conduction measurements, the BEOS test is meant to directly show brain activity. A suspect is read a series of statements that should only trigger memories in someone who actually took part in the events. For example, Sharma was read the statement “I bought arsenic.” Mukundan claims that experiential memories triggered by such statements can be visualized on brain scans and provide evidence of guilt, but a six-member committee led by the current head of NIMHANS called BEOS “unscientific“.

Other evidence against Sharma and Khandelwal was used, such as polygraph tests, but they insist they are innocent. Mukundan claims that the BEOS error rate is only 5% but his work has not been independently verified and has never been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Few specifics about his methodology are available and it remains unclear how he determined that error rating and if it is reliable for all suspects. His test depends on the detection of experiential memories, and since children often cannot accurately recall how they received certain information (whether they learned it themselves through experience or whether they were told it) it seems plausible that this test will not be accurate for people with certain mental defects. Exactly how sensitive the test is also needs to be explored. Could someone who has repeatedly imagined killing someone but not actually done it be falsely accused on the basis of this test? What if someone has dreamed of committing a crime?  However, the most disturbing thing about the use of this test is not that it might not be 100% accurate- it is that judges who allowed the tests to be used ignored the consensus of experts and used evidence that as nonscientists, they cannot fully understand.